How Putin Erased a Genocide

Romanticism and Realities of Modern Siberia

When European Empires conquered their colonies, they were unparalleled powers, factories of genocide, harbingers of new racial norms. When Russia conquered Siberia, it was still a world of brutality and constant warfare, where massacres were normal, where there was no morality of wiping a population from the face of the Earth. Russia was never a “Western power.” No… it was special, absolved of the crimes of the long 19th century, separated from the shame of the empires created during the Age of Exploration. The Putin regime has effectively created a narrative that erases the footprint of Russian culpability in the genocides of the far East, relegating the destruction of the Indigenous peoples of Siberia to the footnotes of colonial history. 

In Siberia, which comprises the far-north and far-east of Russia, there reside nearly a quarter of a million indigenous people representing over 40 ethnic groups.¹ Since the Russian Conquest of Siberia, these populations have been severely neglected by the federal government. Today, many of the tribes are unrecognized by the Kremlin or face economic and cultural discrimination. For Putin, the Imperial age marked an ideal Russian power structure; it was a sprawling, authoritarian state, dictated by one-man rule, a state that looked toward ethnic Russianness and Orthodox tradition as the beacon of progress. The current discriminatory treatment of the indigenous Siberian peoples by the Russian government demonstrates current parallels —however intentional— to the Imperial era as demonstrated through the economic neglect of Siberian peoples, the suppression of their traditions, and the refusal of the Kremlin to properly recognize these people.

First and foremost, what is Siberia? The three most distinct ways to define this region are the Siberian Federal District, geographic Siberia, and historic Siberia. Geographic Siberia, more often than not, comprises the Urals, Siberian, and Far East Federal Districts. Historic Siberia generally includes only the Siberian and Far East Federal Districts. For the sake of this article, reference to Siberia will be in geographic terms as this is representative of the settlement areas of Indigenous peoples. Especially after the resettlements and forced relocations of the Soviet era, it is crucial to provide as large of a geographic area as possible to represent the current homelands of Indigenous peoples.

(The Moscow Times). A Map of modern Russia. The Siberian Federal District and the Far East Federal District shown on the map would both comprise the geographical expanse of historic Siberia.

The Conquest of Siberia began in 1580 with the invasion of the Cossacks led by Yermak. The Cossack invaders captured the Siberian capital of Isker and, by the end of the century, established forts and cities near the northern reaches of the Ob River. Expansion into Siberia was largely driven by the economic potential of the territory, particularly the fur trade which comprised much of Russia’s foreign exports.² Subsequently, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the imperial government imposed a fur tribute to be paid by local tribes.³ This encouraged the nomadic Siberian people to sedentarize, often forcefully assimilating them into Siberian exile economies used primarily for resource export. Notably, these new economies in the peripheries of the Empire did not particularly enrich the native Siberians. Despite common claims that submission to the Russian invaders was “voluntary,” Indigenous peoples were “coerced into submission and then directly exploited as producers of wealth.”⁴ Those that resisted were met with violence. For instance, the Buryats, a tribe located near Lake Baikal in Eastern Siberia, were brought into the folds of tsardom in 1652 with the founding of the city of Irkutsk which served as a major Russian (and assimilation) center.⁵ When they attempted to resist, they were met with the gun power of the Russian military. Perhaps one of the greatest barriers to wealth accumulation was the destruction of the Indigenous peoples themselves. By the mid 17th century, the Yakut people had lost about 70% of their population, and thousands of Chukchi, Koryak, and Kamchadal were massacred in the extensive imperialist efforts of the Kremlin.⁶ Furthermore, in 1742, Empress Elizabeth ordered the extermination of the Chukchi and Korak culture. As Indigenous people were killed by Russian invaders, the establishment of Russian schools served to erase Kamchatka culture well until the 1760s.⁷ The genocide against Siberians is still formally unrecognized by the state and little physical evidence exists to detail the ancient histories of many of these tribes, much of this erasure of Siberian tradition driven by the imposition of Russian culture. 

The Siberian people were faced with the changing demographics of the far east and north which were not simply the result of natural migration, but by intentional, colonial resettlement efforts that continued all the way until the end of the Imperial Era. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad between 1891 and 1905 led to further colonization efforts. As Russia tried to counter the influence of Japan in the early twentieth century, ethnic Russians were encouraged to move eastward; by 1911 only about 12% of the Siberian population was comprised of Indigenous people.⁸ While changing demographics do not indicate oppression alone, it is notable that this expansion of ethnic Russianness was done intentionally, in a direct attempt to “civilize” the frontier. Popova notes that the Imperial Russian government, in its use of Siberia as a land of exile, intentionally flooded the land with Russian peasants and people from the imperial core to populate the Siberian territory.⁹

In the early twentieth century, the Uvarov doctrine was used as a tool to garner support for the tsar, declaring the main tenets of Russian society to be, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality.”¹⁰ Upon taking power, Putin used his own form of Uvarov doctrine to form a “strong and powerful state, just as autocracy was in the tsarist era.”¹¹ Not only is Putin’s policy defined by imperial values, but also by admiration of the aesthetic and cultural remnants of the tsars. The Putin administration has been witness to the reconstruction of religious monuments destroyed by the Bolsheviks and the installation of portraiture and statuary of tsars in government buildings.¹² Putin has revived Brezhnev-era policies of vertical power management through which regional leaders subordinate themselves to Putin.¹³ This power easily comes at the cost of the Indigenous people of Siberia. As Hill and Gaddy argue, “Putin’s conception of the narod is not confined to the ethnic Russian population of the Russian Federation or any particular political or social group.”¹⁴ His maintenance of ethnic Russian tradition —as justified by Uvarov Doctrine— however, ultimately contradicts these ideas of state inclusivity. 

The institutionalized oppression of indigenous Siberian people is visible in the modern obshchina system. Obshchinas were utilized before the Revolution as a village system for peasants, essentially, a peasant commune. Indigenous Siberian people now often reside in communities also titled obshchinas. These obshchinas now function as localized governments for Indigenous populations of Siberia. Moreso, they (ideally) allow for the continuation of traditional occupations, stability that disappeared with the fall of the Soviet Union. For many Siberian people, the obshchinas do not fulfill this purpose of economic optimism. For instance, trade is restricted in the fisheries sector and Indigenous peoples only have access to fishing for “personal needs.”¹⁵ Furthermore, the obshchina terminologically equates the Indigenous peoples with peasantry. Rather than granting the Siberians economic privileges, they have been segregated into communities that are a direct descendent of the very system used to limit the opportunities of serfs in the imperial era. The use of the obshchina as an economic system for the Siberian peoples, shows the reiteration of historical, imperial policy. This makes clear Putin’s desire to have a strong, tsarist-like state when it comes to non ethnic-Russian populations. Additionally, if the obshchinas stray from “traditional” occupations, they are subject to termination by the federal government in order to reduce competition.¹⁶ The Indigenous peoples of Siberia are, thus, kept in a perpetual, state-mandated, romanticized past. Though the Indigenous populations have been granted “priority rights” (giving them priority over local enterprises), “in recent years, there have been intense efforts within the legislative system to have this concept removed from individual acts.”¹⁷ The emphasis on traditional occupations and the self-governance of the obshchinas has, in essence, served as a state-sponsored attempt at autonomy and economic self-sufficiency in Indigenous communities. This autonomy, however, is surface level, as the restrictions on economic activity essentially stunt any potential for economic growth in obshchina communities. Like much of the Indigenous world exposed to colonial powers, many Siberians have become reliant on the Russian state. In the 19th century, for instance, many Siberian tribes became economically dependent on Russian goods. Current state-enforced practices, meanwhile, reduce state provisions for Indigenous peoples and prevent access to both state wealth and full self-sufficiency. Like the use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as a tool for imperial conquest, the expansion of modern industries like energy or agricultural production has negatively influenced the economic situation of the far north.

The systemic oppression of the obshchina system is visible not only in the long-term economic consequences, but also in acts of hostile discrimination by the Kremlin. In 2012, the Dlyacha obshchina located in Buryatia was raided by a special police unit of the State Administration of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow after a series of extensive audits were conducted on the obshchina.¹⁸ Documents were promptly seized from the cooperative in the Buryatian capital of Ulan-Ude. Despite the lack of legal violations, “the obshchina’s operations remained suspended indefinitely” and, in 2013, Dlyacha was shut down.¹⁹ This crippled local economic resources and security. The incident alone would suggest that the Russian government is intent on disparaging the economic systems of Indigenous peoples in order to bolster the influence of competitive, non-Indigenous enterprises (in this case, a competing mining company).²⁰ The closure of Dlyacha also violated UNDRIP Article 23 which guarantees Indigenous peoples the right to development.²¹ In Putin’s Russia, the rights of Indigenous people seem to be an afterthought. The “vertical of power” and strong state fundamentally benefit private enterprises and the central economy over the rights of Indigenous populations. Much like  the initial Conquest of Siberia, resource extraction was of benefit to the colonial metropole and often at the cost of the Indigenous peoples.

The Obshchina system and economic injustice has resulted in poor economic and living conditions for Indigenous peoples of the Russian north. The indigenous Siberian peoples face higher risk of disease, poverty, and low life expectancy. Unemployment within these groups is nearly 2 times higher than the national average with incomes 2 to 3 times lower.²² Indigenous males, in particular, have much lower life expectancies than the average Russian male.²³ These conditions are likely the result of federal policies that prioritize the economic needs of Russian businesses over those of Indigenous peoples. In the Sakha Republic, for instance, local authorities “have prioritized mineral and energy exploitation over local community interests.”²⁴ The same codependence that plagued the Siberian people over a century ago is still in effect as the government continues to prioritize ethnic Russians in urban areas. Furthermore, the oppression of traditional Indigenous economic activities has contributed to the lost livelihood of these people. The economic suppression of Indigenous peoples has also contributed to the destruction of local traditions. The extractive oil and mining industries in Siberia have, in particular, damaged the local economies of Indigenous peoples due to pollution and disruption to reindeer herding.²⁵ Industrial activity has drastically reduced the land available for Indigenous people to conduct economically beneficial activity.²⁶ One collaborative study done by Western University, Carleton University, and the Russian Academy of Sciences claims that the Selkup experience high levels of poverty, not because of their standing as Indigenous people, but because of the fact that they largely live in rural areas.²⁷ While it is evident that rural areas in the Russian Federation are subject to increased levels of poverty, the particular conditions of the obshchinas are of clear detriment to Indigenous peoples in particular. 

During the Conquest of Siberia, local populations were forcibly converted to Orthodox Christianity and assimilated into ethnic Russian culture. Today, Siberian peoples face similar challenges. For many Indigenous people, native languages are one of the main modes of cultural preservation. While the Russian state —after the fall of the Soviet Union— initially allowed for education in minority languages, this privilege was then revoked in a 2007 amendment. The 2007 amendment entailed greater federal control over language education, essentially restricting the amount of minority language instruction which could be provided in schools. Minority languages were to be optional instructional courses in school, rather than compulsory language courses (as is Russian).²⁸ Putin’s “vertical of power” makes previous guarantees to regional autonomy more difficult, especially as the values of Orthodoxy and “traditional” Russian culture are emphasized in the educational system.

Not only are Siberian traditions squandered, but also overshadowed by the promotion of Russian ones. The resurrection of Russian traditions has also hearkened back to the “glory days” of the tsars. Putin, in his quest to revive Orthodoxy, has advocated alongside the Church that schools should include religious education.²⁹ The Church and Putin alike have insisted that Orthodox content in schools is cultural rather than religious.³⁰ In this sense, the multicultural heritage that the Russian state claims to promote is innately tied to Muscovite heritage and the colonial center. Ethnic Russian culture (and historic assimilation to it) is perceived as normative, as inherently voluntary, and as an innate part of Russian life. In addition to prevalent ideas of Orthodoxy as a binding element of Russian life, Russian conquest is understood as an inherent part of history to be embraced in the same way by all citizens; for Putin, there is no violent, colonial past, only a shared mythological idea of glorious, uniform, Russian expansion.

Upon the celebration of the 350th anniversary of Buryat’s capital, Ulan-Ude, a statue of the Cossack founders of the city was erected. This was done amidst local controversy, however, due to the colonial legacy of the Cossack invasion of Buryatia.³¹ During the celebration, Putin was sure to mention that it was 350 years since “Buryatia voluntarily joined the Russian state.”³² Continually, the Russian state has insisted upon the voluntary nature of Siberia’s Russification. The Cossacks were peaceful invaders and the Siberians today face no hardships; according to Putin’s government, Russia is a blissful, multi-ethnic state without racial discrimination. There is a perpetual cycle of myth-making, a cycle that asserts that Russia is for Russians, yet, at the same time, is peacefully multicultural.

Despite the state’s assertions of multiculturalism, some indigenous groups in Russia are not even formally recognized. The Ainu, which historically resided on the Japanese island of Hokkaido have been and still are ignored by the Russian government. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands, to the northeast of Hokkaido were encroached upon by both Russia and Japan.³³ By 1711, Russia’s expansion into Siberia reached the Kuril Islands and policies of assimilation became commonplace.³⁴ The small Kamchatkan Ainu population, meanwhile, is not officially listed as an ethnic group in Russia. In 2016, when Shinzo Abe of Japan and Vladimir Putin met to discuss the status of Russia’s Southern Kurils (known by Japan as Japan’s Northern territories), the question of the Ainu was not even brought up.³⁵ The leader of the Ainu community in Kamchatka, Alexei Nakamura, stated, “the Russian government has not recognized us as Indigenous people of the islands, perhaps because it is convenient for the government to say there weren't natives in the Southern Kurils.”³⁶ This would suggest that Putin has disregarded the Ainu to satisfy a narrative of peaceful and voluntary integration of the far East into the Russian Empire in the Imperial age. While the Russian state has created legislation that acknowledges minorities within the Federation, it is clear there is a lack of transparency and admission on behalf of the Putin administration about the extent of Russian colonization.

Overall, there is little realistic adherence to established laws of the Russian Federation. According to the Russian Constitution, “the Russian Federation shall guarantee the rights of the Indigenous small peoples according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation.”³⁷ Meanwhile, The Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169 is the only “international instrument protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples.”³⁸ Russia has yet to sign onto the convention. While Russia asserts its protection of Indigenous people, it continues to ignore basic legislation that would improve the quality of life for indigenous Siberian citizens. In general, rights to land and abilities to maintain traditional practices have been slowly revoked under the Putin administration. The Federal Land Codex, for instance, has been adapted so that Indigenous peoples must either buy or rent their ancestral lands.³⁹ The Federal Forest Codex, adopted in 2006, allowed for private and government control over the forestry in Siberia, a law that was hotly contested by Indigenous populations.⁴⁰ While an international framework has been established to assist global Indigenous populations, the Russian government has continually violated these standards, whether through economic injustices or refusal to recognize the rights to tribal land ownership.

Ultimately, Putin’s quest for a strengthened state is not based solely on the Imperial model, but also the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. Under the Soviet Union, the traditional culture of the Siberian people was further persecuted. In the late 30s, movement away from nomadism expanded, and settlement was highly encouraged. The animistic religions of the Siberian people were also persecuted as shamanism was formally banned in the 1920s.⁴¹ Independent Indigenous hunting was prohibited under the Soviets as well.⁴² The Soviets easily drew from the tsarist traditions of conquest and colonialism in the peripheries of the Russian Empire. Minority populations, since the inception of the Russian Empire, have faced de jure and de facto discrimination. Whether observers of Putin’s regime choose to view him as an emerging tsar or a Soviet-style autocrat, it is clear that his policy towards the indigenous Siberians is in direct continuity with policies pursued since the 16th century.

The parallels between the initial conquest of Siberia and the modern treatment of Russia’s Indigenous population by the Kremlin demonstrates not only a neglect of Indigenous people by the state, but a deliberate maintenance of Imperial policies. In the context of Siberia, “vertical power” entails preserving Russian tradition and cherry picking instances of “victory” for the Russians, one of the chief examples being the Siberian Conquest itself. By covertly returning to these values under the guise of inclusive policy, Putin is able to maintain an authoritarian rule over the Indigenous people. Modern indigenous Siberians, like their ancestors, are still neglected by the federal government; local cultures are overshadowed by Russian ethnocentrism, indigenous economies are damaged, and the very acknowledgement of these people goes unheard. The resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of government are ever present in Putin’s quest for state power, especially as he invokes the 19th century’s Uvarov doctrine in his quest for state expansion.

1. Peter J. Hotez, “Neglected Infections of Poverty among the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic,” PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases 4, no. 1 (26 Jan. 2010): 1.

2. James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40.

3. Andrei A. Znamenski, “A Vague Sense of Belonging to the Russian Empire,” Arctic Anthropology 36, no. 1/2 (1999): 21.

4. Forsyth, 41.

5. Jesse V. Clardy, “Tsarist Russia and the Russification of the Buriats,” Journal of Church and State 10, no. 1 (1968): 74.

6. Hannibal Travis, Genocide, Ethnonationalism, and the United Nations: Exploring the Causes of Mass Killing Since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 74.

7. Forsyth, 142.

8. Ibid., 191-192.

9. Zhanna Popova, “Exile as Imperial Practice: Western Siberia and the Russian Empire, 1879-1900,” International Review of Social History 63 (2018): 136. 

10. Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 64.

11.  Hill & Gaddy, 69.

12. Ibid., 67.

13. Dmitry Oreshkin, “Putin’s Vertical and the Regions,” in The Russian Economy: Prospects for Putin 4.0, ed. Andis Kudors and Jānis Hermanis (Riga: University of Latvia Press, 2020): 49-50.

14. Hill & Gaddy, 70.

15. Johannes Rohr, Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation Report 18 (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2014), 20.

16.  Ibid., 19.

17. Ibid.

18.  Ibid., 20-21.

19. Ibid., 21.

20. Ibid.

21. UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, Article 23.

22. Rohr, 34.

23. Andrei Vladimirovich Golovnev and Gail Osherenko, Siberian Survival: The Nenets and Their Story (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 4.

24. Marjorie Mendelstam Balzer, “Indigenous Politics, Economic, and Ecological Change in Siberia.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 11, no. 1 (2010): 28.

25. Natalia Yakovleva, “Oil Pipeline Construction in Eastern Siberia: Implications for Indigenous People,” Geoforum 42, no. 6 (July 2011): 711-12.

26. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, “Persistent Toxic Substances, Food Security, and Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North,” United Nations Environment Program AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 26 Nov. 2004, 25.

27. Zemfira Kalugina, Svetlana Soboleva, and Vera Tapilina, “Indigenous People of Northern Siberia,” Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (2006): 312.

28. Szymon Jankiewicz, Nadezhda Knyaginina, and Federica Prina, “Linguistic Rights and Education in the Republics of the Russian Federation: Towards Unity through Uniformity,” Review of Central and East European Law (13 Mar 2020): 70.

29. John Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church,” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 196-197.

30. Clifford J. Levy, “Welcome or Not, Orthodoxy Is Back in Russia’s Public Schools,” The New York Times, 22 Sept. 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/world/europe/23russia.html.

31. Anatoliy S. Breslavsky, “Post-Soviet Ulan-Ude: Content and Meaning of a New Urban Idea,” Inner Asia 14, no. 2 (2012): 309.

32. “Vladimir Putin Visits the Central Stadium in Ulan-Ude and congratulates Buryatia residents on the 350th anniversary of the republic’s accession to Russia,” Pravitel’stvo Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡sii, 2010,  http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/15775/print/.

33. Lutfullah Mangi, “Northern Territories,” Pakistan Horizon 55, no. 3 (3 July 2002): 60.

34. Takakura Shinichiro and John A Harrison, “The Ainu of Northern Japan.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 50, no. 4 (1960): 49.

35. Takayuki Tanaka, “Russian Ainu Leader Calls for Greater Respect,” Nikkei Asia, 3 Mar. 2017, asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Russian-Ainu-leader-calls-for-greater-respect.

36. Ibid.

37. Constitution of the Russian Federation. Chapter 3, Article 69.

38. Alexandra Xanthaki, “Indigenous Rights in the Russian Federation.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 76.

39. Rohr, 21.

40. Ibid., 22.

41. Forsyth, 287-289.

42. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, 22.